Phoenix area Navy veteran reflects on his Katrina heroics 20 years later

Editor’s note: Michael Matagrano is a metro Phoenix resident.

To the editor,

Twenty years after Hurricane Katrina’s catastrophic landfall on Aug. 29, 2005, the actions of Navy helicopter Lts. Bryce Kammeyer, Michael Matagrano, David Shand and Matt Udkow, along with their rescue swimmer crews, stand as a stark reminder of the tension between individual courage and systemic failure. These aviators risked careers and lives to save more than 110 people in New Orleans. Their story is not only one of valor but of the consequences when bureaucracy delays action.

Standby and frustration

At Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Fla., the Helicopter Support Unit had established alert and backup crews ready to deploy post-storm. When Katrina struck, high winds initially grounded rescue aircraft. By 7 a.m. Aug. 30, crews led by Lt. Shand and Lt. Matagrano (backup), and Lt. Udkow and Lt. Kammeyer (primary), were briefed and prepared to fly.

Awaiting orders, they were forced into hours of “standby,” waiting for authorization. Despite at least six urgent requests from the Coast Guard, base leadership responded only with that they were “working a plan.” Lt. Rich Rocha, another HSU pilot, was working at the city Emergency Operations Center, also receiving multiple calls from the Coast Guard and Escambia County for rescue assistance. Rocha stated he passed that information to the NAS Pensacola base XO where there was no action. By mid-afternoon, moral had collapsed.

Eventually, Udkow’s crew was tasked with delivering supplies to Stennis Space Center, with strict orders from Air Operations Boss CDR Mike “Krusty” Holdener to avoid search-and-rescue operations. Udkow’s team complied, reporting no survivors sighted en route. Later, both crews received similar supply missions with instructions to return by sunset. When Shand inquired about rescues, Holdener’s response — “Just be back by sunset” — was interpreted as potential flexibility.

While unloading at Stennis, a Coast Guard call for help came over the radio pleading for any helicopters in the area to proceed to the University of New Orleans, with coordinates given. Shand and Matagrano calculated the distance (20 miles) and fuel remaining and had to make a choice: obey orders or save lives. They decided as a crew to answer the call, aware of potential repercussions. They then discussed this with Udkow’s crew, who were in agreement. Both aircraft proceeded to New Orleans without external guidance, with no planning, no coordination, traffic separation or support as they entered the chaotic, hazard-filled airspace.

They were on their own, flying in a “Wild West” environment. Upon entering the city limits, Udkow’s crew broke off from formation and proceeded to rescue survivors from rooftops, facing risks like rotor wash from a National Guard helicopter that caused a very dangerous settling-with-power incident. Reflecting on the mission, Lt. Udkow later shared: “The most difficult aspect of the rescue missions was deciding who would be hoisted into the helicopter and who would be left behind, as we had only a finite amount of space, fuel and mission time before dark.”

During one hoist of a man trapped in his attic, rescue swimmers AD2 Justin Crane and AT2 Jake Mclaughlin went down the wire with an ax to make an egress hole for the trapped person.

“My decisions regarding the rescues were based on what locations had the largest concentration of people in a small area, as this would help expedite our hoisting operations,” said Udkow. “While this was the logical decision in my mind, it was difficult to be facing someone close to eye level in a hover and have to pass them by with their arms waving and yelling for help, due to the mission and time constraints.”

Shand’s crew proceeded to the coordinates for the University of New Orleans. Adapting to the environment, they had to maneuver around hazards such as power lines, power poles and National Guard Aircraft. They initiated rescues over an apartment building hovering at 15 feet instead of the standard 40 feet in order to expedite hoisting survivors. They rescued 23 people on their first runs and transported them to a staging area near Lakefront Airport. After a final survivor drop and at Bingo fuel (minimum fuel required to safely reach your destination), a survivor reported of two blind men left behind in the complex. The decision needed to be made: Do you go back and search the building for these two blind men or head 20 miles south to Joint Reserve Base New Orleans for fuel?

Matagrano recalculated the fuel and stated they can give their rescue swimmer five minutes in a hover, no more, and the decision was made to go look for the two blind men. Aircrewman AW1 Robert Reyes went into the building navigating hazardous conditions, racing the rats to the roof and emerged with both men and three other survivors 15 minutes later. The crew saved 28 people before refueling at JRB New Orleans.

During refueling, both crews coordinated with a grateful Coast Guard Captain overseeing rescue efforts and were able to call base operations via a sat phone. After informing NAS Pensacola leadership of their status and requesting to continue, they were permitted to proceed but reminded to return by sunset. Udkow’s crew conducted additional rooftop rescues, while Shand’s crew initially headed back to the University, they responded to a call about survivors on a bridge surrounded by rising waters where the waters were expected to rise 3 feet in the next few hours. Navigating very tight clearances, they landed their H-3 helicopter multiple times on a two-lane side of the bridge, pushing the aircraft’s limits with each lift, barely scraping by power lines and even encountering a dangerous and potentially deadly condition of retreating blade stall.

Udkow and Kammeyer returned to Pensacola by sunset, but Shand and Matagrano continued rescues. On their final bridge lift, a man chose to stay behind with his wife who was still in an apartment building, due to limited space on the aircraft. As the crew dropped off survivors at Lakefront Airport, a note about an abandoned baby with a street address was passed to Matagrano. Frustrated by this, Matagrano later shared that he “felt helpless since their navigation system was only compatible with GPS coordinates and there was nothing we could do. “With a baby of my own on the way, this hit hard and was a reality check of the toll of this crisis and the weight of the decisions you have to make.”

The note was handed to local EMS and law enforcement since they would have the best resources to find the baby. As darkness fell, low fuel and lack of night-vision goggles forced their return, leaving Coast Guard and National Guard helicopters to continue nighttime operations. Upon leaving the city, looking down, they saw blackness filled with a sea of flashlights shining at them as they flew by.

Reprimand and tensions

The next morning, instead of commendations, the pilots faced a heated reprimand in the XO’s office, with threats to revoke Aircraft Commander designations, though these were not acted upon due to operational needs. The message was clear: Following your conscience carried career risk. This is the kind of punishment that stifles initiative in crisis — exactly the opposite of what disaster leadership demands.

A chaplain-led debrief revealed the pilots’ struggles with balancing orders against moral imperatives, compounded by the emotional weight of leaving survivors, like the reported abandoned baby behind. Sleepless nights followed, haunted by those left unaided. That night, between both aircraft, 110 souls were saved. The U.S. Navy never officially recognized the rescues however Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation did. The flight schedule had almost come to a stop with the only authorized missions to be those that directly supported the base.

A few days after Katrina struck the Gulf Coat, Lt. Daniel Vicario worked inside the Air Operations SAR office at NAS Pensacola where the walls were covered with maps of New Orleans and Biloxi, marked with red pins for urgent calls for rescue. With constant radio chatter and ringing phones in the background, he received a call from what he suspected was a reporter.

“Are you flying SAR mission into New Orleans? The caller asked. Vicario paused, weighing his words, to be sure not to violate protocol. He replied: “I can’t discuss specifics, but what I can tell you is that I am looking at three UH-3 Sea Kings parked on the flight line.” The voice responded, “Thank you. You’ll be on the front page of the New York Times tomorrow.”

Vicario hung up, uneasy. He didn’t know at the time that his answer would precede a rescue mission he would fly later that day that would draw national attention.

The New York Times article, which highlighted these events, was published Sept. 7, leading to Udkow’s temporary reassignment to kennel duties, which a Los Angeles Times article attempted to clarify as not punitive. The New York Times piece has since been used as a case study in Navy leadership courses to discuss decision-making under pressure and moral decisions that conflict with orders.

Broader context and a call to action

Katrina exposed systemic coordination failures that drew national scrutiny. A 2006 U.S. Senate report criticized the slow federal response, including debates over military activation under Posse Comitatus. A 2006 GAO report detailed inadequate pre-storm planning. These failures were not isolated — they were structural.

Two decades later, FEMA continues to face budget cuts, staffing shortages and administrative complexities that hinder effective disaster response. America cannot afford to repeat the Katrina model of centralized delay. A return to state-led disaster management, as practiced before FEMA’s 1978 establishment, will enhance agility. Pre-FEMA, states leveraged local knowledge and resources, enabling faster decisions and tailored strategies. This decentralized approach will mitigate the bureaucratic delays seen in Katrina and foster more equitable recovery by addressing community-specific needs. Federal agencies should support — not smother — local action.

Congress and the White House must confront this reality: The next disaster will not wait for federal paperwork. If Katrina taught us anything, it is that courage at the individual level cannot overcome paralysis at the institutional level. A shift toward empowering state-led disaster systems is not optional — it is urgent.

Twenty years later, the memory of thousands of flashlights shining desperately from the flooded darkness of New Orleans demands that we act.

Michael Matagrano (Arizona), Richard Rocha, Matt Udkow and Daniel Vicario